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Abstract
■ Recent studies show that motor responses similar to those
present in one’s own pain (freezing effect) occur as a result of
pain observation in others. This finding has been interpreted as
the physiological basis of empathy. Alternatively, it can repre-
sent the physiological counterpart of an embodiment phenom-
enon related to the sense of body ownership. We compared the
empathy and the ownership hypotheses by manipulating the
perspective of the observed hand model receiving pain so that
it could be a first-person perspective, the one in which embodi-
ment occurs, or a third-person perspective, the one in which
we usually perceive the others. Motor-evoked potentials (MEPs)
by TMS on M1 were recorded from first dorsal interosseous
muscle, whereas participants observed video clips showing (a)
a needle penetrating or (b) a Q-tip touching a hand model, pre-
sented either in first-person or in third-person perspective. We
found that a pain-specific inhibition of MEP amplitude (a signif-
icantly greater MEP reduction in the “pain” compared with the
“touch” conditions) only pertains to the first-person perspective,
and it is related to the strength of the self-reported embodiment.
We interpreted this corticospinal modulation according to an
“affective” conception of body ownership, suggesting that the
body I feel as my own is the body I care more about. ■
INTRODUCTION
In the first decade of the 21st century, the mirror neurons
paradigm (Rizzolatti, Cattaneo, Fabbri-Destro, & Rozzi,
2014) has exercised a strong influence in cognitive neuro-
science, and from the domain of action where it was dis-
covered, a “mirror-matching” simulation mechanism has
been extended to other domains, including emotional
experience (Keysers et al., 2004; Singer et al., 2004; Gallese,
2003). According to this mechanism, the emotional state
of an individual activates corresponding representations
in another individual observing that state. In a seminal
paper, Avenanti, Bueti, Galati, and Aglioti (2005) demon-
strated that motor responses, similar to those present in
one’s own pain (i.e., freezing effect), occur as a result of
pain observation in others. Consistent with the “mirror-
matching” simulation theory, this finding has been inter-
preted as the neurophysiological basis of empathy for
other’s pain (Singer & Frith, 2005). According to this view,
the brain could use self-representation as a reference for
perception of painful events occurring to others’ body by
“mapping external stimuli onto one’s own body” (Avenanti
et al., 2005).
In the Avenanti and colleagues (2005) paper, as well as
in a series of further papers (Avenanti, Sirigu, & Aglioti,
2010; Avenanti, Minio-Paluello, Bufalari, & Aglioti, 2009;
Avenanti, Minio-Paluello, Minio Paluello, Bufalari, & Aglioti,
2006; Avenanti et al., 2005), motor-evoked potentials
(MEPs) were recorded from the first dorsal interosseous
(FDI) muscle, whereas participants observed video clips
showing either a needle penetrating or a Q-tip touching
a hand model. The main finding of these studies was a
pain-specific freezing effect, that is, a significant decrease
of the MEP amplitude in the needle compared with the
Q-tip condition. It is important to note that the specificity
of this freezing effect has been extensively described
(Avenanti et al., 2005, 2006). To investigate the muscle
selectivity, MEPs were recorded either from the hand mus-
cle underlying the skin region penetrated/touched by the
needle/Q-tip (FDI) or from a nearby hand muscle (abduc-
tor digiti minimi, ADM). The pain-specific freezing effect
was present in FDI and not in ADM, suggesting a high
specificity of the effect related to the recording muscle.
To investigate the body part selectivity, MEPs were re-
corded from the hand muscles while different stimuli were
presented: needle/Q-tip penetrating/touching different
body parts, such as hand or foot, or a noncorporeal object,
such as a tomato. The effect was present for the obser-
vation of a needle entering the hand and absent during
the observation of a needle entering the feet or a non-
corporeal object, suggesting a high specificity of the freez-
ing effect related to the observed body part. A number of
other variables have also been manipulated, such as the
stimulus intensity (e.g., hand penetrated by a needle vs.
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hand pin-picked; Avenanti et al., 2006), the observed hand
congruency (e.g., right vs. left; Avenanti, Minio-Paluello,
Sforza, & Aglioti, 2009), and the observed hand race
(e.g., in-group vs. out-group; Avenanti et al., 2010). How-
ever, to the best of our knowledge, the stimulus presen-
tation perspective has never been investigated, and the
hand model has always been presented in a first-person
perspective.
In recent years, the increasing interest for the concept
of body ownership (i.e., the belief that a specific body
part belongs to one’s own body; e.g., Tsakiris, 2010) pays
specific attention to the relation between the perspective
through which a body part is observed and the possibility
for the participants to experience it as part of their own
body (i.e., embodiment phenomenon). Converging evi-
dence, coming from experimental manipulations in healthy
participants (e.g., rubber hand illusion [RHI]; Kalckert &
Ehrsson, 2012; Petkova, Khoshnevis, & Ehrsson, 2011;
Makin, Holmes, & Ehrsson, 2008; Costantini & Haggard,
2007; Tsakiris & Haggard, 2005; Ehrsson, Spence, &
Passingham, 2004) and in pathological conditions after
brain damage (e.g., delusion of body ownership; Garbarini
et al., 2013, 2014, 2015), shows that embodiment occurs
only when the rubber/alien limb is located in a position
coherent with the participants’ higher-order and pre-
existing body representation, whenever it is perceived
from a first-person perspective.
In this study, we aimed at disentangling the empathy
and the ownership hypothesis by manipulating the per-
spective of the observed hand model receiving pain, so
that it could be a first-person perspective, the one in
which embodiment occurs, or a third-person perspec-
tive, the one in which, in everyday life, we perceive the
body parts of others (Ruby & Decety, 2001). If the pain-
specific corticospinal modulation, found by the Avenanti
and colleagues studies when stimuli were presented in a
first-person perspective, also occurs in a third-person
perspective, this would confirm the empathy for others’
pain hypothesis. Alternatively, a perspective-dependent
effect, only related to the first-person viewpoint, would
suggest that this pain-specific corticospinal modulation
represents the physiological counterpart of an embodi-
ment phenomenon, related to the sense of body owner-
ship. Likewise, a correlation between physiological
measures and empathic traits may confirm the empathy
hypothesis; conversely, a correlation with a measure of
subjective embodiment disposition, as that obtained by
means of the RHI paradigm, may support the bodily own-
ership hypothesis.
METHODS
Participants
Twenty participants tookpart in the experiment (12women;
mean age ± SD= 24.3 ± 3.34 years, range = 20–36 years).
Because of technical problems during MEP recording and
participants’ availability to complete the experiment, four
participants were excluded from the analysis, resulting in a
sample of 16 participants (10 women; mean age ± SD =
24.12 ± 3.7 years, range = 20–36 years). All were right-
handed according to the Standard Handedness Inventory
(Oldfield, 1971), with normal or corrected-to-normal visual
acuity. None of them had a history of neurological, major
medical, or psychiatric disorders, and they were free from
any contraindication to TMS (Rossi, Hallett, Rossini, &
Pascual-Leone, 2009). Before starting the experimental ses-
sion, each participant was naive as to the purposes of the
study and signed an informed consent; information about
the study purpose was provided only at the end of the
experimental session. The experimental procedure was
granted ethical approval by the Ethics Committee of the
University of Turin and was carried out in accordance with
the principles of the revised Helsinki Declaration (World
Medical Association General Assembly, 2008). None of
the participants reported discomfort or adverse effects
during TMS acquisitions.
Stimuli
Four different color video clips were used as experi-
mental stimuli: (i) a right hand presented in first-person
perspective deeply penetrated by a needle on the FDI
muscle (“pain first-person”), (ii) a right hand presented
in third-person perspective deeply penetrated by a needle
on the FDI muscle (“pain third-person”), (iii) a right hand
presented in first-person perspective touched by a Q-tip
on the FDI muscle (“touch first-person”), and (iv) a right
hand presented in third-person perspective touched by
a Q-tip on the FDI muscle (“touch third-person”). More-
over, two further video clips were used as baseline
condition: (a) a dorsal view of a right hand presented in
first-person perspective (“baseline first-person”) and (b) a
dorsal view of a right hand presented in third-person
perspective (“baseline third-person”).
TMS Stimulation and EMG Recording
TMS is a noninvasive brain stimulation technique exten-
sively used in cognitive neuroscience (Miniussi, Harris, &
Ruzzoli, 2013). In this study, TMS pulses were adminis-
tered using aMagstimRapid2 stimulator (Magstim,Whitlan,
Dyfed, Wales, UK) connected to a 70-mm figure-of-eight
coil positioned over the left primary motor cortex (M1)
hand region. The coil was held tangentially to the scalp
with the handle pointing backwards and laterally 45° away
from the mid-sagittal line, such that the flow induced by
the second most effective phase of the biphasic pulse
moved in a posterior anterior direction (Di Lazzaro et al.,
2001; Kammer, Beck, Thielscher, Laubis-Herrmann, &
Topka, 2001). This orientation permits the lowest motor
threshold, optimizing the stimulation (Brasil-Neto, Pascual-
Leone, Valls-Sole, Cohen, & Hallett, 1992). Before the re-
cording session, the coil was moved in steps of 1 cm over
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the left motor cortex to determine the individual optimal
position (OSP) from which maximal MEP amplitudes were
elicited in FDI. Once the OSP was found, the individual
resting motor threshold (rMT) was determined as the low-
est stimulus intensity that induced at least five MEPs (at list
50 μV peak-to-peak amplitude) of 10 consecutive TMS
pulses in the recorded muscle (Rossini et al., 2015). Mean
rMT was 58% (ranging from 41% to 78%) of maximum
stimulator intensity. During the recording session stimu-
lation, intensity was set at 115% of the rMT. MEPs were
recorded from the FDI muscle of the participant’s right
hand. The registration of this muscle was selected because
it is the same muscle penetrated by a needle or touched
by a Q-tip in the presented video clips. EMG activity was
recorded by pairs of Ag–AgCl surface electrodes (11 mm
diameter; EL503) connected to a Biopac MP-150 electro-
myograph (Biopac Systems, Inc., Santa Barbara, CA). They
were placed in a classical belly–tendon montage: the active
electrode over the muscle belly and the reference elec-
trode over the associated joint or tendon. The ground
was placed over the participant’s left elbow. The EMG
signals were acquired at 10 kHz sampling rate, amplified,
filtered with a band-pass (10–500 Hz) and a notch (50 Hz)
filter, and stored on a PC for offline analysis.
Experimental Procedure
TMS Experiment
The experiment was carried out in a dimly illuminated
room where participants were seated in a comfortable
armchair with their head positioned on a fixed head rest.
A single experimental session lasted 1 hr 45 min approx-
imately, and each session was divided in two blocks. The
task (see Figure 1) consisted in watching video clips dis-
played on a 17-in. monitor (resolution = 1280 × 780
pixels, refresh frequency = 60 Hz, background lumi-
nance = 0.5 cd/m2) placed at a distance of 80 cm. Partic-
ipants were instructed to lay motionless on the armchair
and to keep their hands in a prone position on a pillow,
Figure 1. Schematic representation of the experimental protocol and design. Top left: A graphic representation of the experimental setting. A
participant watching the video stimuli, presenting hand models in a first- or third-person perspective, while TMS pulses were delivered over the left
M1. Top right: The stimuli presented in the baseline conditions. A static hand was randomly presented either in the first- or third-person perspective.
TMS pulses were delivered 1424 msec after stimulus onset. Bottom: The stimuli presented in the experimental conditions. The hand model,
presented in a first- or third-person perspective, penetrated by a needle or touched by a Q-tip. TMS pulses were delivered at two possible time
points: early time (200 msec after needle penetration/Q-tip touch; i.e., at 1224 msec after stimulus onset) and late time (600 msec after needle
penetration/Q-tip touch; i.e., at 1624 msec after stimulus onset).
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trying to relax the muscles as much as possible. TMS-
induced MEPs from the right FDI muscle were acquired
once for each video presentation at one of two possible time
points: early time (200 msec after needle penetration/Q-tip
touch) and late time (600 msec after needle penetration/
Q-tip touch). These stimulation times correspond to the
earliest and the latest stimulation times used in previous
experiments (Avenanti et al., 2005, 2006, 2010; Avenanti,
Minio-Paluello, Bufalari, et al., 2009; Avenanti, Minio-
Paluello, Sforza, et al., 2009), where the TMS pulse was
randomly triggered between 200 and 600 msec before
the end of the video clip. Here, capitalizing on the results
of previous studies (Borgomaneri, Gazzola, & Avenanti,
2014; Fecteau, Pascual-Leone, & Théoret, 2008), we con-
trolled the time variable, stimulating at two defined time
points (early; late), because the literature recently evi-
denced two different phases in the functional modulation
of the motor cortex: An earlier time of stimulation should
evidence an orienting response; a later time of stimulation
might represent motor resonance. Each video clip pre-
sentation was followed by 8200 msec of intertrial interval:
A white fixation cross was presented for 7200 msec and
was then replaced by a green cross (1000 msec), prompt-
ing the participant to watch the new video clip. Each
video clip lasted 1800 msec. For each block, video clips
of each condition were presented nine times in a ran-
dom order, resulting in a total of 72 trials (4 video clips ×
9 repetitions × 2 time points). Baseline measures of
the corticospinal excitability were also assessed prior to
and following the video presentations by means of two
supplementary series of 12 MEPs. A static hand was
randomly presented six times for each of the two perspec-
tives (first-person and third-person). TMS stimulation was
delivered 1424 msec after stimulus onset. Thanks to these
series of MEP registrations, we checked for any cortico-
spinal excitability change related to TMS per se between
the beginning and the end of each experimental block;
these MEP average amplitudes were calculated to set indi-
vidual baselines for data normalization. The stimulus pre-
sentation timing, EMG recording, and TMS triggering, as
well as stimuli randomization, were controlled by E-Prime
V2.0 software (Psychology Software Tools, Inc., Pittsburgh,
PA) running on a PC.
Self-report Measures of Empathy, “Self-recognition,”
and “Body Ownership”
To investigate the subjective trait of empathy, we admin-
istered the Italian version (Bonino, Coco, & Tani, 2010)
of the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI; Davis, 1983),
which is a self-report multidimensional psychometric
measure composed of 28 items designed to measure
both cognitive and emotional components of empathy.
Participants rated each item on a 5-point Likert scale,
ranging from “Does not describe me well” to “Describes
me very well”. The scale has four subscales (each made
up of seven different items): Perspective Taking (e.g.,
“When I am upset at someone, I usually try to ‘put myself
in his shoes’ for a while”), Fantasy Scale (e.g., “I really get
involved with the feelings of the characters in a novel”),
Empathic Concern (e.g., “When I see someone being
taken advantage of, I feel kind of protective towards
them”), and Personal Distress (e.g., “In emergency situa-
tions, I feel apprehensive and ill-at-ease”). Each subscale
score ranges from 0 to 28.
To investigate the contribution of a self-recognition
mechanism, suggestive of the tendency of participants
to recognize the hand on the screen as a video represen-
tation of their own hand and of the presence of a proper
illusory experience of bodily ownership, an ad hoc two-
question questionnaire was administered. Four videos,
each one representative of a single experimental condition
(pain first-person, pain third-person, touch first-person,
touch third-person), were shown to participants along
with two items referred to the specific condition shown.
Item 1 (i.e., self-recognition question): “I felt as if the
touch/prick was delivered to the hand I recognized as
mine.” Item 2 (i.e., body ownership question): “I felt as if
the hand penetrated/touched in the video was part of my
own body.” Participants were asked to rate their agree-
ment/disagreement with these questions by using a 7-point
Likert scale, ranging from −3 (i.e., I don’t agree at all) to
3 (i.e., I totally agree), with “0” corresponding to neither
agreeing nor disagreeing.
RHI Experiment
To measure the subjective embodiment disposition in
our sample, an additional experiment employing the
RHI (Botvinick & Cohen, 1998) procedure, known to
modulate the sense of bodily ownership in healthy par-
ticipants, was carried out. The role of the perspective
through which the rubber hand is perceived in modu-
lating the strength of the embodiment has also been
investigated (Kalckert & Ehrsson, 2012; Petkova et al.,
2011; Ehrsson et al., 2004). We employed a black wooden
box (60× 40× 20 cm) divided in halves (30× 30× 20 cm)
by a perpendicular panel. One of the halves was open to
the view to allow sight of the rubber hand, whereas the
other half prevented the sight of the participant’s real
hand. Two square holes (12 × 12 cm) placed on both
horizontal sides of the box accommodated the partici-
pant’s arm and the rubber hand. A black towel covered
the participant’s shoulders and the proximal end of
both the real and the rubber hand to create the illusion
that the rubber hand was jointed to the participant’s body.
A wooden panel (30 × 30 cm) was used to cover the top
of the box at the end of each experimental condition.
The box was placed in front of the participant’s chest
(at a distance of about 15 cm) and disposed to have the
rubber hand aligned with the participants’ right shoulder.
Before starting, participants were familiarized with the
setting and instructed about all the procedures and the
rating scales. The participants’ right arm was placed inside
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the portion of the box hidden to the view; the palm was
facing down, and the fingers were stretched out. In the
other portion of the box, open to the view, was placed
a right rubber hand (at a distance of approximately
25 cm from the participant’s hand), exactly where the
participants’ hand had to be. During each experimental
condition, participants were asked to look attentively
at the rubber hand index finger waiting for the forth-
coming stimulations of the rubber hand’s index finger
(with a brush) for 180 sec. All participants underwent all
conditions, which comprised different experimental set-
ups according to the perspective from which the rubber
hand was observed (first- or third-person perspective) and
the type of stimulation (synchronous or asynchronous
condition). In summary, there were four conditions (first-
person synchronous, third-person synchronous, first-
person asynchronous, third-person synchronous), and
the condition sequence was counterbalanced among
participants (see Figure 5, left). After each condition,
participants were asked to answer to a questionnaire
about the illusion experience. The questionnaire was
composed of eight items (Kalckert & Ehrsson, 2012;
see Table 1). Four (I1–I4) served to capture different as-
pects of the illusory perception (e.g., the sensation of
touches on the rubber hand and the change in the beliefs
of ownership of that hand), and four (I5–I8) served as
control items to assess task compliance and susceptibil-
ity effects. Participants had to rate their agreement/
disagreement on a 7-point Likert scale with ranging from
“+3” (agree very strongly) to “−3” (disagree very strongly),
where “0” corresponded to neither agreeing nor dis-
agreeing. To avoid any possible carryover effects of the
illusion, after each condition participants rested for about
60 sec.
Data Analysis
To prevent contaminations of MEPs by background EMG
activity, trials with any background activity greater than
50 μV in the 100-msec window preceding the TMS pulse
were excluded from the MEP analysis. EMG data were
collected for 300 msec after the TMS pulse. Data were
analyzed offline using AcqKnowlege software (Biopac
Systems, Inc., Santa Barbara, CA) and Statistica Software
6.0 (StatSoft, Inc., Tulsa, OK). Averaged peak-to-peak
amplitudes of MEPs recorded on FDI were computed
separately for each condition (pain first-person, pain third-
person, touch first-person, touch third-person) and for
the two stimulation conditions (early and late). MEP
amplitudes deviating more than 2 standard deviations
from the mean for each condition and trials contaminated
by muscular preactivation were excluded from the analy-
ses and considered as outliers (2%).
To control for the possible effect of TMS per se in
modulating corticospinal excitability, a preliminary analy-
sis was conducted by means of a 2 × 2 × 2 repeated-
measure ANOVA on the baseline mean raw MEP values
with perspective (first-person, third-person), block (first,
second), and session (before, after the experimental
block) as within-subject factors. In the main analysis of
the physiological data, for each block, the MEP values re-
corded from each experimental condition were averaged
and normalized as percentage of the mean MEP value re-
corded from the baseline condition of each experimental
block (MEP ratio =MEPobtained/MEPbaseline × 100). Normal-
ized data were entered into a 2 × 2 × 2 repeated-measure
ANOVA with perspective (first-person, third-person), time
of stimulation (early, late), and valence of stimuli (pain,
touch) as within-subject factors. Post hoc comparisons
were performed by means of Duncan test.
For both the “self-recognition” and the “body owner-
ship” item, the participants’ rating scores in each condition
were averaged and entered into a 2 × 2 repeated-measures
ANOVA, with valence of stimuli (pain, touch) and perspec-
tive (first-person, third-person) as within-subject experi-
mental factors. To investigate single contrasts of interest,
planned comparisons were performed. To examine whether
a relation existed between the physiological data (MEP
values in the pain first-person condition at the late time
of stimulation) and behavioral data (self-recognition and
body ownership ratings in the pain first-person condition),
we also performed a linear regression where the nor-
malized MEP values were used to predict the questionnaire
ratings. Finally, according to the Avenanti and colleagues
(2005) method, for correlation analyses with the scores ob-
tained at the IRI subscales, we computed an index of MEP
amplitude change as follows: MEP amplitude during the
pain condition minus amplitude during the corresponding
(first-person or third-person) baseline condition divided
by the average of the same two conditions. For each pain
condition (early pain first-person, early pain third-person,
late pain first-person, late pain third-person), the obtained
values were used to predict the scores obtained at the
IRI subscales.
For the RHI questionnaire, in each condition the par-
ticipants’ rating scores (normalized in z scores) were
Table 1. The Questionnaire, Consisting of Eight Statements
Divided in Real and Control Items (Kalckert & Ehrsson, 2012)
1. I felt as if I was looking at my own hand.
2. I felt as if the rubber hand was part of my body.
3. It seemed as if I were sensing the touch of the paintbrush
in the location where I saw the rubber hand touched.
4. I felt as if the rubber hand was my hand.
5. I felt as if my hand was turning rubbery.
6. It seemed as if I had more than one right hand.
7. I appeared as if the rubber hand were drifting toward my
real hand.
8. I felt as if I had no longer a right hand, as if my right hand
had disappeared.
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averaged and entered into a 3 × 2 repeated-measure
ANOVA, with stimulation (synchronous, asynchronous),
perspective (first-person, third-person), and items (real,
control) as within-subject experimental factors. Post hoc
comparisons were carried out using the Duncan test.
Furthermore, we performed a linear regression, where
the normalized MEP values (of the first-person condition
in the late time of stimulation) were used to predict
the strength of the illusion, which was expressed as an
index calculated by using only the real item ratings in
the first-person condition and expressed as the differ-
ence between ratings during the synchronous and the
asynchronous condition.
RESULTS
EMG Results
Preliminary analysis on the MEPs acquired during the
baseline conditions showed neither significant main effects
nor interactions. This means that (a) nonspecific perspec-
tive effects were absent (Perspective: F(1, 15) = 0.22, p =
.64), (b) the cortical excitability was unchanged in the
second compared with the first experimental block (Block:
F(1, 15) = 0.9, p = .76), and (c) TMS per se did not in-
duce any change in corticospinal excitability (Session: F(1,
15) = 1.47, p = .24).
Repeated-measures ANOVA on normalized MEP ampli-
tudes revealed a significant interaction among perspective,
time of stimulation, and valence of stimuli (F(1, 15) = 5.08,
p = .039; see Figure 2). This indicates that a pain-specific
inhibition of MEP amplitude (i.e., a significantly greater
MEP reduction in the pain compared with the touch con-
dition) only pertains to the late time of stimulation and
to the first-person perspective (MEP mean amplitude ±
SD: late touch first-person = 0.95 ± 0.49; late pain first-
person = 0.65 ± 0.21; p = .007). No difference between
pain and touch conditions was found at the early time of
stimulation or when stimuli were presented in third-
person perspective. Overall, the MEP amplitude in the
late pain first-person conditions was significantly lower
with respect to all the other conditions ( p < .05 for each
post hoc comparison). It is interesting to note that a
significant difference between first- and third-person
perspective only pertains to the pain condition in the
late time of stimulation (MEP mean amplitude ± SD: late
pain first-person = 0.65 ± 0.21; late pain third-person =
0.86 ± 0.38; p = .038). No significant perspective effect
was found in the early time of stimulation or for the
touch conditions. Examples of MEPs recorded from the
FDI muscle of a representative participant are shown in
Figure 2.
Self-report Measures Results and Correlations with
Physiological Data
The repeated-measure ANOVA on the scores of the “self-
recognition” item showed a main effect of the valence of
stimuli (F(1, 15) = 23.57, p= .0002) and perspective (F(1,
15) = 22.1, p = .0003), indicating a higher rating in pain
compared with touch stimuli (mean ± SD: pain = 0.15 ±
1.85; touch =−1.21 ± 1.73) and in first-person compared
with third-person perspective (mean ± SD: first-person =
−0.08±1.73; third-person=−1.25±1.83). The repeated-
measure ANOVA on the scores of the “body ownership”
item showed a main effect of the valence of stimuli (F(1,
15) = 5.51, p = .03) and perspective (F(1, 15) = 16.97,
p = .0009), indicating a higher rating in pain compared
Figure 2. MEP results. The
graph shows the mean MEP
amplitudes, expressed as
percentage of the baseline,
in the four experimental
conditions (Pain first-person,
Pain third-person, Touch
first-person, Touch
third-person) and in the
two times of stimulation
(Early, Late). Error bars
indicate SEM (*p < .05).
Raw MEP amplitudes recorded
from FDI muscle in one
representative participant
during different experimental
conditions at the late time
of stimulation.
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with touch stimuli (mean ± SD: pain = −0.09 ± 2.08;
touch = −1.84 ± 1.7) and in first-person compared with
third-person perspective (mean ± SD: first-person =
−1.16 ± 1.94; third-person = −2.06 ± 1.74). Finally, both
in the “self-recognition” and “body ownership” items, the
mean score in the pain first-person condition was the
highest and was significantly different compared with all
other conditions ( p < .05 for each planned comparison;
see Figure 3).
According to the linear regression analysis, the nor-
malized MEP values, recorded at the late time of stimula-
tion in the pain first-person condition, were significantly
related to the ratings reported in the body ownership
item: The smaller the MEP amplitude, the higher the
“body ownership” score over the observed hand model
(R2 = 0.27; p = .037); see Figure 4, left). Conversely,
no significant relation with the ratings reported in the
self-recognition item was found. For what concern the
IRI questionnaire scores, no significant correlation was
found with the index of MEP amplitude change.
RHI Results and Correlations with Physiological Data
The repeated-measure ANOVA on the RHI subjective rat-
ing revealed a significant interaction among stimulation,
perspective, and items (F(1, 15) = 20.05, p= .0004). This
result indicates that a specific RHI effect only pertains to
the real items (I1–I4) after synchronous stimulation in
the first-person perspective (i.e., the strength of the illu-
sion is significantly greater in real items after synchro-
nous stimulation in first-person compared with all other
conditions; p< .0002 for each comparison; see Figure 5).
The linear regression analysis revealed that normalized
MEP values in the pain first-person condition significantly
predicted the extent to which participants experienced
the illusion of ownership over the rubber hand in the
Figure 4. Left: Linear
regression “body ownership
score by MEP” amplitude. The
MEP amplitude, at the late time
of stimulation, was used as
independent variable to predict
the feeling of body ownership
over the hand model reported
on a 7-point Likert scale. Right:
Linear regression “RHI strength
by MEP” amplitude. The MEP
amplitude, at the late time
of stimulation, was used as
independent variable to predict
the strength of the RHI
expressed as difference
between asynchronous and
synchronous condition.
Figure 3. Self-report measure
of “self-recognition” and “body
ownership.” The graph shows
the mean subjective scores
in the four experimental
conditions (Pain first-person,
Pain third-person, Touch
first-person, Touch
third-person). Error bars
indicate SEM (*p < .05).
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synchronous first-person condition (R2 = 0.25; p= .047).
This suggests that the stronger the inhibition effect ob-
served in MEP amplitude is, the greater is the subjective
embodiment disposition during the RHI (see Figure 4,
right).
DISCUSSION
In this study, we asked whether pain-specific motor
responses occurring during pain observation can repre-
sent, as previously suggested (Avenanti et al., 2005),
the physiological basis of empathy or, alternatively, can
be better explained by an embodiment mechanism re-
lated to the sense of body ownership. To answer this
question, we manipulated the perspective of the ob-
served hand model receiving pain, whereas MEPs to
single-pulse TMS on left M1 were recorded from the right
FDI muscle. According to the Avenanti and colleagues
studies, a pain-specific corticospinal modulation can be
described as a significant decrease of the MEP amplitude
in pain compared with touch conditions. However, our
results show that this motor response only pertains to
the late time of stimulation and, most importantly, to the
first-person perspective.
The evidences concerning the onset of the modulation
of the corticospinal excitability after an observed action
are rather contradictory. Although some studies show
that modulation of TMS-induced MEPs can occur 60–
90 msec after the salient stimulus (Lepage, Saint-Amour,
& Théoret, 2008), other studies fail to report this early
modulation, suggesting that muscle-specific modulation
can be induced only by late components of the mirror
response (Cavallo, Heyes, Becchio, Bird, & Catmur,
2014). These findings have raised the intriguing hypoth-
esis of a separation between early and late components
of the mirror response (e.g., Candidi, Sacheli, Mega, &
Aglioti, 2014; for a review, see Naish, Houston-Price,
Bremner, & Holmes, 2014): an initial muscle-unspecific
modulation would be followed by a later phase of mod-
ulation, which would be muscle-specific (Romani, Cesari,
Urgesi, Facchini, & Aglioti, 2005) and then closely related
to a motor resonance mechanism (Borgomaneri et al.,
2014). Our findings, in agreement with the Fecteau et al.
(2008) study, corroborate this two-stage hypothesis show-
ing an effect of time on CS excitability.
The literature supporting the empathy for pain hypoth-
esis, that is, that the same neural mechanism under-
pinning the perception of physical pain can be involved
in the observation of others’ pain (e.g., Lamm, Decety, &
Singer, 2011; Valeriani et al., 2008; Godinho, Magnin,
Frot, Perchet, & Garcia-Larrea, 2006; Avenanti et al.,
2005; Singer et al., 2004) also suggests that self-related
variables, such as the proximity and the tangibility of
the observed pain, can play a crucial role in determining
the empathetic experience (e.g., de Vignemont & Singer,
2006; Jackson, Rainville, & Decety, 2006). Along this line
of research, for instance, Mahayana et al. (2014) have
found, during the observation of others’ pain, a signifi-
cant corticospinal inhibition (i.e., reduction in MEP ampli-
tude) for stimuli presented in peripersonal space and
not for stimuli presented in extrapersonal space. The
authors interpreted this proximity-related response as a
consequence of the misidentification of sensory infor-
mation as being directly related to the observer. The neu-
ral basis of a shared peripesonal space representation,
including both self and other’s body, has been described
in monkeys (Ishida, Nakajima, Inase, & Murata, 2009) and
in humans (Brozzoli, Gentile, Bergouignan, & Ehrsson,
2013). In the monkey, the activity of parietal bimodal
neurons with receptive fields anchored on the monkey’s
body has been shown to exhibit visual responses matched
to corresponding body parts of the experimenter (Ishida
et al., 2009). In the human, a specific cluster of neurons
in the ventral premotor cortex are active when visual
Figure 5. Left: Schematic representation of the RHI experimental design and setting. A participant watched a right rubber hand either in first- or
third-person perspective being touched synchronously or asynchronously with the real hand. Right: RHI ANOVA results. Significant interaction
among stimulation, perspective, and items. Subjective rating scores are expressed as z scores. Error bars indicate SEM (*p < .05, ***p < .0005).
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stimuli enter the perihand space, irrespective of whether
the observed hand, always positioned in first-person per-
spective, is the participant’s own hand or that of another
person (Brozzoli et al., 2013). A similar visual response to
stimuli delivered within self and others’ perihand space is
particularly relevant in our experimental context, because
the premotor cortex is only one synapse away from the
motor cortex and can likely contribute to modulate its
activity during MEP recording.
In the context of the empathy for pain hypothesis, the
perspective-related constraint has never been investi-
gated, and the hand model has been always presented
in a first-person perspective. However, to corroborate
the empathy for others’ pain hypothesis, a pain-specific
effect should also be found when the stimuli are pre-
sented in a third-person perspective, the one in which
we usually perceive and interact with the body parts of
others (e.g., Ruby & Decety, 2001). The notion about the
importance of the perspective through which a body part
is observed comes from the results of the embodiment-
related literature, investigating the alterations of the
sense of body ownership both in experimental manip-
ulations in healthy participants and in pathological con-
ditions after brain damage. One of the more compelling
demonstrations of the mechanisms subserving body
ownership has been obtained in healthy participants by
means of an experimental procedure known as the RHI
(e.g., Botvinick & Cohen, 1998). Essentially, watching a
rubber hand being stroked while one’s own unseen hand
is stroked synchronously can lead to a sense of ownership
over the rubber hand (as self-reported at the body owner-
ship questionnaire) and to a shift in the perceived position
of the real hand (as measured by the proprioceptive drift).
Previous studies have shown that the illusion effect dis-
appears when the fake hand is rotated (i.e., it is perceived
from a third-person perspective) or misaligned with re-
spect to the participant’s shoulder (Kalckert & Ehrsson,
2012; Petkova et al., 2011; Costantini & Haggard, 2007;
Lloyd, 2007; Austen, Soto-Faraco, Enns, & Kingstone,
2004; Ehrsson et al., 2004; Farnè, Pavani, Meneghello, &
Làdavas, 2000; Pavani, Spence, & Driver, 2000). In brain-
damaged participants, a monothematic delusion of body
ownership has been described where patients treat and
care for the examiner’s hand as if it was their own, showing
a consistent embodiment of the alien hand in their own
body schema (Garbarini et al., 2013, 2014, 2015; Pia,
Garbarini, Fossataro, Fornia, & Berti, 2013). This delusion
of ownership, although resembling the RHI, is sponta-
neous and not induced by any experimental procedure.
Interestingly, as for the rubber hand embodiment, this
phenomenon occurs only when the alien hand is per-
ceived in a first-person perspective and it is aligned with
the patients’ contralesional shoulder, exactly where it is
normally expected to be. If the alien hand is perceived
from a third-person perspective or it is misaligned with
respect to the patient’s shoulder, the pathological em-
bodiment does not occur and patients correctly identify
their own hand. In this study, the results of the additional
RHI experiment, showing an illusory effect in the syn-
chronous condition only when the fake hand was per-
ceived in first-person perspective, clearly confirm the
importance of the perspective-related constraint in trigger-
ing multisensory mechanisms leading to the bodily self-
representation.
According to a philosophical definition of the term
“Embodiment,” “E is embodied if and only if some prop-
erties of E are processed in the same way as the proper-
ties of one’s body” (de Vignemont, 2010). In line with
this definition, by recording the skin conductance re-
sponse during noxious stimulations, previous studies on
the RHI in healthy participants (Guterstam, Petkova, &
Ehrsson, 2011; Armel & Ramachandran, 2003) and on the
pathological embodiment after brain damage (Garbarini
et al., 2014) showed that an alien hand can be so deeply
embedded into one’s own somatosensory experience as
to elicit physiological reactions specific to the own hands.
In this study, we demonstrated that a motor response,
comparable to that found when the participants receive
nociceptive stimuli on their own body (freezing effect;
Urban et al., 2004; Farina, Tinazzi, Le Pera, & Valeriani,
2003), also occurs when the nociceptive stimuli were
delivered to someone else’s hand, whenever it is perceived
in a first-person perspective, automatically leading to a
sort of embodiment. It has been proposed that, because
previous studies examining corticospinal excitability
when experiencing pain used methods (e.g., saline injec-
tion, electrical stimulation) that prevent preparation of
appropriate pain avoidance reactions (Urban et al., 2004;
Farina et al., 2001, 2003; Le Pera et al., 2001), an anes-
thetic motor inhibition is the most adaptive response
(De Coster, Andres, & Brass, 2014). Accordingly, a situa-
tion in which participants passively observe pain delivered
to a hand model may preclude the possibility to prepare
an avoidance reaction to that pain and, therefore, can lead
to a modulation of the corticospinal excitability in terms of
inhibition rather than facilitation. Conversely, by manipu-
lating the sense of agency over the observed hand model
(always presented in first-person perspective) and by
positioning the participants in a body posture allowing
pain avoidance, a facilitation of the corticospinal system
has been observed (De Coster et al., 2014).
In this study, we replicated the setup and stimuli pro-
posed in previous studies (Avenanti et al., 2005, 2006,
2010; Avenanti, Minio-Paluello, Bufalari, et al., 2009) to
compare first-person and third-person perspective and
to disentangle an empathy and a body ownership inter-
pretation. We acknowledge that the present setup of MEP
recording was not optimally designed to elicit a full
embodiment effect, as that observed during the RHI
(Kalckert & Ehrsson, 2012; Petkova et al., 2011; Makin
et al., 2008; Costantini & Haggard, 2007; Tsakiris &
Haggard, 2005; Ehrsson et al., 2004; Botvinick & Cohen,
1998) or during the virtual hand illusion (Slater, Perez-
Marcos, Ehrsson, & Sanchez-Vives, 2008). Indeed, for
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rubber/virtual hand illusion to work, the hand must be
placed in an anatomically plausible position, at a maxi-
mum distance of 30 cm from the real hand (Costantini
& Haggard, 2007). In future experiments, this could be
achieved by placing the screen on the table and having
the participant put his or her hand under the screen to
create a “see-through” effect. A similar setup can also
allow to carry out future experiments in which the ob-
server’s hand posture and the hand model visual perspec-
tive can be systematically manipulated to more deeply
investigate the role of the postural congruency during
MEP recording. The lack of a full embodiment effect can
also be seen in the mean rating at the body ownership
item, which, together with the pain first-person condi-
tion, did not reach values higher then zero (mean ± SD =
−0.43 ± 2.06), contrary to what is usually reported when
a full embodiment occurs. This means that participants
seemed to be uncertain whether they experienced illusory
ownership or not. On the contrary, the mean rating at the
self-recognition item reaches rather high scores in the
pain first-person condition (mean ± SD = 0.93 ± 1.56),
suggesting that, in this condition, participants tended to
consider the prick delivered to the hand model as if it
was delivered to the hand they recognized as their own.
However, both items showed similar pain and perspective
effects in the ANOVA analysis and significantly greater
ratings in the pain first-person condition with respect to
all the other conditions. These behavioral results mirror
the physiological results, showing that the MEP amplitude
was significantly lower in the pain first-person condition
with respect to all other conditions. Crucially, in the pain
first-person condition, a significant correlation between
physiological and behavioral data was found only when
considering the body ownership item: The stronger the
freezing effect, implicitly measured as a drop in the MEP
amplitude recorded from the FDI muscle, the stronger
the embodiment sensation, explicitly reported at the body
ownership questionnaire. Furthermore, the significant
correlation between the freezing effect in the pain first-
person condition and the extent to which participants
experienced the RHI in the synchronous first-person con-
dition also suggests that a mechanism related to the con-
cept of bodily ownership can play an important role in
explaining the present data. This indicates a mutual inter-
action between our conscious beliefs about the body and
the physiological mechanisms within the body.
It is worth noting that the perspective-dependent
effect we describe only pertains to the pain condition
at the late time of stimulation. A previous study investi-
gating the perspective effect on motor imagery showed a
greater facilitation of MEP recorded from FDI in third-
person imagery, where the action was clearly attributable
to another person, with respect to first-person imagery
(Fourkas, Avenanti, Urgesi, & Aglioti, 2006). Together
with our results, these findings showed lower values
when MEPs were recorded in first-person compared with
third-person perspective. Thus, it was crucial to investi-
gate the presence of a nonspecific perspective effect.
However, we did not find a significant perspective effect
either at the early time of stimulation or in the touch con-
dition. Furthermore, no difference was found between
the baseline values recorded when the hand model was
presented in first-person and third-person perspectives,
suggesting absence of a nonspecific perspective effect.
The key finding of this study is that a pain-specific in-
hibition of MEP amplitude (i.e., a significantly greater
MEP reduction in pain compared with touch conditions)
only occurs in a first-person perspective. On the contrary,
no difference between pain and touch conditions was
found when stimuli were presented in a third-person
perspective. Crucially, the corticospinal excitability was
directly related both to the subjective embodiment dis-
position, as measured by the RHI, and to the extent to
which the participants reported, while observing the
hand model being penetrated, to feel “as if” the pene-
trated hand was part of their own body. On the contrary,
unlike previous studies (Avenanti et al., 2005), in our
sample no significant correlation between the index of
MEP amplitude change and the empathetic traits, as
reported at the IRI questionnaire, was found. Taken
together, these findings suggest that the motor response
of the onlooker can be better interpreted referring to the
concept of body ownership than to the empathy for
others’ pain hypothesis. In particular, these data are
suggestive of an “affective” conception of body owner-
ship (de Vignemont, 2014), indicating that the body I feel
as my own is the body I care more about, the one to
which I react when under threat.
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